






































Legislative Responses to Data Breaches and 






Summary:  On July 23, 2008, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia hosted a workshop to discuss federal and state 
legislative responses to data breaches. The workshop addressed several laws and 
legislative initiatives designed to create greater safeguards for personal consumer 
information frequently targeted by data thieves and often subject to the failures of 
information security protocols. Diane Slifer, J.D., M.B.A., who has frequently 
presented at forums on data security and has represented clients in matters related 
to data breaches, led the workshop. Slifer examined several highly publicized data 
breaches and explained how various laws and regulations have been put in place in 
order to protect and inform consumers whose personal information has been 
compromised. Additionally, she discussed several legislative initiatives designed to 
potentially create a more structured and secure environment for private consumer 
data overall. This paper summarizes Slifer’s presentation, the ensuing discussion, 
and additional Payment Cards Center research. In addition, it offers a brief 
overview of recent data breaches, a description of various ways that federal and state 
laws operate, and some thoughts on how effective these laws and regulations have 
been. 
* Payment Cards Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, 
Philadelphia, PA 19106. E-mail: philip.keitel@phil.frb.org. The views expressed here are not 
necessarily those of this Reserve Bank or of the Federal Reserve System. The contents of this 
paper and Slifer’s presentation at the workshop are intended to be informational in nature and 
should not be considered legal advice.   Individuals, companies, and entities should seek legal 




I.  Introduction 
The increased importance of data in modern consumer finance and the resulting digitization of 
massive amounts of consumer information have caused a proliferation of data systems that store and 
transmit sensitive personal information. While the use of such consumer data enables financial institutions 
to deliver significant benefits to consumers, it also introduces new risks associated with securing the data. 
In fact, stores of confidential consumer data have attracted the attention of cyber criminals who attack 
data storage systems for the purpose of gaining large-scale access to consumer financial information in 
order to commit fraud.
1 Since 2005, over 1,000 data breaches have been reported in the United States.
2 
Data storage systems at financial institutions, hospitals, retailers, government agencies, schools, libraries, 
and local municipalities have all been breached, leaving more than 240 million
3 Americans potentially 
exposed to subsequent crimes incorporating stolen data.
4 Moreover, attacks of this nature appear to be 
increasing. By the beginning of September 2008, 449 data breaches had been reported for the year,
5 
already passing the total of 446 for all of 2007 and greater proportionally than the two-year data breach 
total from 2005 and 2006 (estimated at 570 breaches).
6  
Although it is popularly believed that most data breaches are the result of computer hacking, the 
logistical difficulties inherent in handling personal consumer information contained in data storage 
                                                 
1 Crimes that commonly incorporate stolen consumer information include payment fraud and identity theft. For 
more information, see Government Accountability Office, Data Breaches and Identity Theft Report, GAO-07-737 
(Jun. 4, 2007), p. 5, noting the use of stolen data for account fraud (akin to payment fraud) and new account creation 
(true identity theft); and Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, U.S. Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section, ―Data Breaches: What the Underground World of ‗Carding‘ Reveals,‖ Santa Clara Computer and 
High Technology Journal, 25 (forthcoming), detailing criminal activities that involve consumer payment card and 
other confidential data.    
2 See Data Breaches and Identity Theft Report [n. 1], p. 4, analyzing evidence of reported data breaches from 2005 
and 2006 across a number of varying types of institutions; and Verizon Business Risk Team, ―2008 Data Breach 
Investigations Report,‖ (2008), pp. 5-6, reviewing 500 breaches and concluding that the overall number of data 
breaches from 2005 through 2007 may be as high as three to four times the number reviewed.  
3 See the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, ―A Chronology of Data Breaches,‖ available at: 
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm, providing a timeline of reported data breaches and a number of 
records containing personal consumer information that may have been exposed (accessed Sept. 4, 2008). 
4 In February, more than 4.2 million consumers‘ credit and debit card numbers and expiration dates were exposed as 
a result of a single data breach at Hannaford Bros. grocery chain. See ―Litigation Comes Quickly on Heels of 
Breach,‖ Consumer Financial Privacy Bulletin, a Consumer Financial Services Law Report supplement, April 16, 
2008, p. 1. 
5 Identity Theft Resource Center, ―Breaches Blast ‘07 Record; as of August 22, ITRC‘S List Surpasses 446 
Documented Breaches,‖ PR Newswire, Aug. 25, 2008, p. 1.  
6 See Data Breaches and Identity Theft Report [n. 1], p. 4. 3 
 
systems have resulted in a significant number of data losses. For example, personal consumer data have 
been misappropriated by employees,
7 obtained by criminals who intended to steal computers—but not 
necessarily the data located on those machines,
8 exposed through inadvertent error,
9 sold to criminals 
posing as legitimate businesses,
10 and lost during transport.
11 Moreover, Bank of New York Mellon and 
credit card issuer GE Money recently disclosed the loss of computer data backup tapes containing 
thousands of consumers‘ personal information.
12 As a result of these highly publicized losses and greater 
attention to losses not related to hacking, industry analysts and policymakers are focusing more on how 
data are stored, transported, and cared for.  
These emergent consumer data security and handling issues and the relatively new criminal 
phenomena associated with them have been met with a bevy of industry
13 and government responses. In 
particular, the major payment network companies American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB 
International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa Inc. joined forces in 2006 to create the Payment Card 
Industry Security Standards Council.
14 Founded to establish and promote ―a multifaceted security 
standard that includes requirements for security management, policies, procedures, network architecture, 
software design and other critical protective measures,‖ the council endeavors to create a more structured 
consumer data environment by designing and communicating standard practices to combat data security 
shortcomings. One such example is the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, or PCI DSS, a 
                                                 
7 See the syndicated AP article: ―Fidelity: Worker Stole Consumer Data,‖ as reported by CBS News, July 3, 2007.    
8 Chris Mondics, ―Data Breaches a Concern to Companies,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 19, 2008, p. C5. See also 
Martin Bosworth, ―Consumer Data Stolen from TransUnion,‖ ConsumerAffairs.com, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 1; and 
MSNBC Interactive, ―Laptop with GE Employment Data Stolen,‖ MSNBC, Sept. 26, 2006, providing examples of 
cases in which computers containing confidential consumer information were stolen by individuals with an apparent 
intent to re-sell those machines. 
9 ―Data Breaches a Concern to Companies,‖ [n. 8], p. C5. 
10 See Jeff Leeds, ―Bank Sold Credit Card Data to Felon,‖ Los Angeles Times, Sept. 11, 1999, p. A-1; Joseph Menn 
and David Colker, ―ChoicePoint CEO Had Denied Any Previous Breach of Database,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 3, 
2005, p. C1. 
11 Syndicated AP article, ―Bank of America Loses Consumer Data,‖ as reported by MSNBC and MSNBC.com, 
March 1, 2005. 
12 Louis Berner, ―‗Security‘ for Sale,‖ Cards & Payments 21(4) (April 2008), pp. 22, 24, 26-27; Daniel Wolfe, 
―Bank of New York Mellon Enlarges Data Loss,‖ American Banker, Aug. 29, 2008.   
13 See, for example, Frederick Lowe, ―Payments Industry Comes Together to Fight a Common Enemy,‖ Cards & 
Payments (July 2006), pp. 25-28, detailing ways in which the payment industry has responded to data-security issues 
and fraud. 
14 See www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about/index.shtml (accessed Sept. 9, 2008). 4 
 
set of protocols that companies handling and storing network-branded payment cards must follow,
15 and 
that a few states, such as Minnesota and California, are beginning to incorporate into their own legislative 
initiatives.
16 Around the same time as private payments industry operators formed the council, President 
George W. Bush recognized ―the heavy financial and emotional toll‖ that crimes involving confidential 
consumer data —such as identity theft
17—exact from victims as well as the economic cost of crimes that 
depend on the unauthorized use of consumers‘ information. In an effort to stem the tide of these crimes, 
he established the President‘s Task Force on Identity Theft.
18 Charged with  creating a strategic plan that 
increases the effectiveness and efficiency of measures taken by the federal government  ―in the areas of 
identity theft awareness, prevention, detection, and prosecution,‖
19 the task force includes individuals 
from the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and several other government 
agencies.
20 In addition to the council and the task force, joint industry and government groups, such as the 
Anti-Phishing Working Group,
21 and not-for-profit groups, such as the Identity Theft Resource Center,
22 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
23 and Electronic Privacy Information Center,
24 are also working to combat 
crimes related to the theft of confidential consumer data.  
 Recognizing the importance of emergent government and industry initiatives surrounding the 
maintenance and handling of confidential consumer information and related crimes, the Payment Cards 
                                                 
15 See n. 14 as well as www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml.  
16 See Laura Mahoney, ―Data Breach Bill Passes California Senate; Business Opponents Eye Governor‘s Veto Pen,‖ 
Bureau of National Affairs Inc., Banking Daily, Aug. 29, 2008, p. 1; and Jaikumar Vijayan, ―‗I‘ll Be Back‘: Vetoed 
Data Breach Bill Goes to Schwarzenegger Again,‖ Computerworld (Sept. 3, 2008).  
17 For more information on identity theft, see Keith B. Anderson, Erik Durbin, and Michael A. Salinger, “Identity 
Theft,‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2) (Spring 2008), pp. 171-92. 
18 See www.idtheft.gov/about.html (accessed Sept. 10, 2008). 
19 On April 23, 2007, the task force issued recommendations on a plan for combating identity theft. To view the 
plan, entitled ―Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan,‖ visit: www.idtheft.gov/reports/ 
StrategicPlan.pdf.  
20 See www.idtheft.gov/about.html.   
21 See, for example, www.antiphishing.org/ (accessed Sept. 10, 2008), detailing the aims of a joint law enforcement 
and industry working group established to combat phishing crimes. 
22 See www.idtheftcenter.org/ (accessed Sept. 10, 2008). 
23 See www.privacyrights.org/index.htm (accessed Sept. 10, 2008). 
24 See http://epic.org/ (accessed Sept. 10, 2008). 5 
 
Center held a conference in 2006 entitled ―Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting 
Cardholder Information: Facing Up to the Challenges.‖
 25 Issues addressed during the conference included 
industry and regulatory responses to information security concerns and data breaches, the impact of data 
breaches and identity theft on consumers and businesses, and ways in which consumers can be better 
protected from harm associated with data breaches. To revisit regulatory and policy-related issues raised 
during the 2006 conference and to look at how consumer data security concerns are contemplated under 
various laws, the Payment Cards Center held a workshop on July 23, 2008. The center invited Diane 
Slifer, who has frequently presented at forums on data security and has represented clients in matters 
related to data breaches, to lead the workshop‘s discussion and overview of several key laws, regulations, 
and legislative initiatives aimed at creating a more secure and structured environment for private 
consumer data and one designed to help protect consumers whose personal information has been 
compromised. This paper, based on Slifer‘s presentation and additional research by the Payment Cards 
Center, offers an overview of several laws
26—or types of laws—that have been enacted to address 
emerging issues related to data breaches and to better safeguard consumers‘ personal information.
27 This 
paper also offers insight into responses to these laws.  
This paper first looks at federal laws and legislative initiatives discussed during the workshop, 
including provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 and the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003. Second, it addresses state laws, including state laws 
concerning the handling of Social Security numbers and state data breach notification laws.  Last, it 
                                                 
25 For more information, see James C. McGrath and Ann Kjos, ―Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting 
Cardholder Information: Facing Up to the Challenges,‖ Payment Cards Center Conference Summary, Sept. 13-14, 
2006, available at: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-
center/events/conferences/2007/C2006SeptInfoSecuritySummary.pdf. payment-cards-
center/events/conferences/2007/C2006SeptInfoSecuritySummary.pdf.  
26 Since1999, Congress and a number of state legislatures have enacted laws that address how consumers‘ personal 
information is stored, how it is maintained, the ways in which it must be safeguarded, and how it must be disposed 
of. This paper addresses several of these laws. However, the references to laws and legislative initiatives contained 
herein are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all federal or state regulations about private consumer information. 
Rather, this paper summarizes a sampling of related laws and initiatives.  
27 In this context, personal information generally means an individual‘s name along with his or her Social Security 
number, account number (including direct deposit accounts, credit card numbers, and debit card numbers) together 
with passwords or access codes used with those accounts, and/or driver‘s license/state identification card number 
that also identifies that consumer. See also n. 41. 6 
 
concludes with a summary of the regulatory environment, recent findings on the effectiveness of data 
breach notification laws in preventing subsequent fraud crimes, and thoughts on how consumers can be 
shielded from harm associated with data breaches and information security failures.  
 
II.  Consumer Data Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act   
  In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, also known 
simply as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act). The underlying intent of the GLB Act was to 
modernize and enhance competition in the financial services industry by repealing provisions of the 
Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company acts
 that had prohibited banks from engaging in activities 
such as affiliating with securities companies or conducting certain insurance-related activities.
28 However, 
in response to last minute congressional negotiations,
29 consumer privacy provisions were added to the 
bill.
30 As a result, the GLB Act has three principal provisions that protect consumers‘
31 personal financial 
                                                 
28 See Conference Report on S. 900, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional 
Record (Nov, 2, 1999), p. H11256; and Senate Banking Committee Conference Report on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Bill, (Nov. 1, 1999), available at: http://banking.senate.gov/conf/confrpt.htm (accessed Sept. 11, 2008). 
29 Senate Banking Committee Conference Report on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley bill, at Title V- Privacy. Available at: 
http://banking.senate.gov/conf/fintl5.pdf (accessed Dec. 5, 2008).  
30 Some policy analysts view the enactment of the privacy provisions of the GLB Act as a legislative response to 
mounting public displeasure with financial institutions‘ practices concerning consumers‘ personal information, 
highly publicized sales of consumer information to disreputable organizations, and growing international awareness 
of data security concerns (such as the E.U. Data Protection Directive and ensuing E.U.-U.S. agreements). For more 
information, see, for example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center‘s history of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
recounting events and conditions leading up to the act‘s passing, available at: http://epic.org/privacy/glba/ (accessed 
Sept. 11, 2008). 
31 Under the GLB Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (2007), only customers of financial institutions are 
entitled to receive privacy notices automatically, and customers are considered a subset of consumers at large. 15 
U.S.C. § 6809(9) defines a ―consumer‖ as ―an individual who obtains, from a financial institution, financial products 
or services which are to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and also means the legal 
representative of such an individual.‖ Defining a ―customer,‖ under the GLB Act, or, more aptly, defining when a 
customer relationship is established, is left to the regulatory agencies themselves. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(11) states, ―The 
term ‗time of establishing a customer relationship‘ shall be defined by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 
of this title, and shall, in the case of a financial institution engaged in extending credit directly to consumers to 
finance purchases of goods or services, mean the time of establishing the credit relationship with the consumer.‖ 
One example comes from 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(h) (2008), which defines ―customer‖ simply as: any consumer ―who 
has a customer relationship with you.‖ A ―customer relationship‖ is defined under 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(i)(1) as ―a 
continuing relationship between a consumer and you under which you provide one or more financial products or 
services to the consumer that are to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.‖ 7 
 
information held by financial institutions:
32 (1) the financial privacy rule; (2) the safeguards rule; and (3) 
the pretexting provision (pretexting is when a person, without authority to do so, attempts to gain access 
to the personal information of another by creating a false scenario).
33 Generally, the financial privacy rule 
calls for financial institutions to establish and communicate policies concerning their use of consumers‘ 
personal financial information and to afford consumers control over how their information is shared with 
others; the safeguards rule requires financial institutions to have a security plan in place to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of personal consumer information; and the pretexting provision encourages 
institutions covered by the GLB Act to implement safeguards against pretexting.  
More specifically, the financial privacy rule
34 requires financial institutions to provide notices to 
their customers explaining their privacy practices and the customer‘s rights. All privacy notices must be 
updated at the time a financial institution makes changes to its privacy policies, and annually—even if no 
policy change occurs. Privacy policies must identify in clear, conspicuous, and accurate language what 
―nonpublic personal information‖ is collected and disclosed about customers. Privacy notices must also 
detail how such information is used, how the financial institution protects or safeguards the information, 
and with whom the information might be shared. Additionally, privacy notices need to inform customers 
of their right, in many instances, to opt out of having their information shared with third parties and to opt 
out of having certain information (such as credit report or application information) shared with their 
financial institution‘s affiliates.
35  
The financial privacy rule essentially requires financial institutions to notify customers about the 
protection of their personal information. Noting that industry analysts have raised the concern that most 
notices merely satisfy the basic legal requirement to explain obligations and rights accurately, workshop 
participants observed that many notices seem to fall far short when it comes to providing explanations 
                                                 
32 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) defines ―financial institution‖ as ―any institution the business of which is engaging in 
financial activities as described in section 1843(k) of title 12‖ (12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2007)).  
33 The FTC defines pretexting as ―the use of false pretenses, including fraudulent statements and impersonation, to 
obtain consumers‘ personal financial information, such as bank balances.‖ See the FTC‘s website: 
www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/pretexting.html (accessed Aug. 19, 2008). 
34 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) et seq. 
35 The right to opt out of information sharing between affiliates exists under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 8 
 
that are meaningful to the reader. This is a sentiment echoed by consumers, state attorneys general, and 
privacy advocates—all of whom have expressed their concern over the complexity of privacy notices and 
the ability of consumers to understand the terms they contain,
36 and some of whom have raised the issue 
of consumer desensitization to mailed notices and alerts.
37 Responding to these concerns, regulators have 
provided updated guidance on how institutions might structure simpler and more comprehensible 
notices.
38 
Under the safeguards rule,
39 financial institutions
40 must develop written security plans detailing 
how they will protect the confidentiality and integrity of personal consumer information.
41 Plans may be 
tailored to the organization‘s size and complexity, the activities the organization undertakes, and the type 
of information handled, but they must take into consideration all areas of an organization‘s operations, 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Joanna Glasner, “Survey: Opt-Out Is a Cop Out,‖ Wired (May 7, 2002), discussing responses to 
consumer privacy protections created under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; and testimony of Edmund Mierzwinski, 
consumer program director of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Oversight Hearing on Financial Privacy and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act, available at: www.privacyrights.org/ar/USPirg-GLB0902.htm, detailing concerns surrounding 
consumers‘ ability to understand privacy policy notices.    
37 Testimony of Edmund Mierzwinski [n. 36], at section (2). 
38 Materials to educate consumers on the financial privacy rule are available from 
www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule_con.html (accessed Aug. 17, 2008). 
39 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b). 
40 The term ―financial institution‖ encompasses a broad range of businesses. In fact, the safeguards rule has been 
extended by the Federal Trade Commission implementing regulations to ―any financial institution that is handling 
‗consumer information‘… [and] a wide range of entities, including: nondepository lenders; consumer reporting 
agencies; debt collectors; data processors; courier services; retailers that extend credit by issuing credit cards to 
consumers; personal property or real estate appraisers; check-cashing businesses; mortgage brokers, and any other 
entity that meets this definition.‖ See ―Federal Trade Commission Standards for Safeguarding Customer 
Information,‖ Final Rule of the Federal Trade Commission, 67 Fed. Reg. 36484-94 [codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 314]. 
See also ―Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer information and Rescission of 
Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness,‖ Final Rule of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office 
of Thrift Supervision, Federal Reserve System, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8616-41, implementing the safeguards rule of the GLB Act.  
41 The terms ―personal information‖ or ―personally identifiable information,‖ as used by the FTC, ―mean 
individually identifiable information from or about an individual consumer including, but not limited to: (a) a first 
and last name; (b) a home or other physical address, including street name and name of city or town; (c) an email 
address or other online contact information; (d) a telephone number; (e) a Social Security number; (f) credit or debit 
card information, including card number, expiration date, and security code; (g) a persistent identifier, such as a 
customer number held in a ―cookie‖ or processor serial number, that is combined with other available data that 
identifies an individual consumer; and (h) information that is combined with any of (a) through (g) …‖ In the Matter 
of Life is Good Inc. and Life is Good Retail Inc., Agreement Containing Consent Order of the FTC, File No. 072 
3046, Jan. 17, 2008, p. 3, number 1. 9 
 
including accounting for areas such as employee management and training, information systems 
management, and system failure planning. 
Workshop participants explained that developing an appropriate written information security 
program to safeguard personal consumer information requires institutions to take a number of steps. 
These steps include: (1) designating an employee or employees to coordinate safeguards; (2) identifying 
and assessing risks (while evaluating the effectiveness of current safeguards for controlling the risks); (3) 
designing and implementing written policies and procedures to manage risks;
42 (4) developing a response 
plan; (5) evaluating and adjusting the program as needed; and (6) carefully considering the services 
provided by third parties. Participants also noted that financial institutions, which under implementing 
regulations include a broad range of businesses,
43 must have information security plans in place and 
cannot represent to consumers that their information is protected if in fact it is not—or is not to the degree 
represented.
44 Overall, responses have been positive to the safeguard rule‘s implementing regulations and 
to actions related to the safeguard rule.
45 Consumer
46 and business
47 representatives have expressed 
approval for what they view as a step in the right direction, indicating that both parties recognize the 
importance of comprehensive data safeguards in today‘s technological environment. 
 Last, provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act seek to safeguard against pretexting by 
requiring financial institutions to protect consumers‘ information and by making it a crime for an 
individual to attempt to fraudulently access another‘s confidential information. As previously mentioned, 
                                                 
42 See pp. 12-14, noting that the FACT Act requires financial institutions covered under the GLB Act to incorporate 
rules about disposing of consumer data into written information security program practices required by the GLB 
Act. 
43 See n. 40. 
44 For more information on enforcement actions related to the safeguards rule, see “FTC Enforces Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act‘s Safeguards Rule Against Mortgage Companies,‖ Federal Trade Commission Press Release, Nov. 16, 
2004, pp. 1-2. 
45 See John Schwartz, ―Settling with F.T.C., Microsoft Agrees to Privacy Safeguards,‖ New York Times, Aug. 9, 
2002. 
46 See, for example, the letter from Calvin R. Ashley, on behalf of numerous individuals, to the secretary of the 
Federal Trade Commission, dated Oct. 9, 2000, expressing support for the safeguards rule, available at: 
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/glbcommentextension/ashley.htm.    
47 See, for example, the Oct. 15, 2001, letter from Ken Brandt, managing director of Tiger Testing, to the secretary 
of the Federal Trade Commission, characterizing the safeguards rule as ―a move in the right direction: toward 
increased systems and privacy safeguards‖ available at: www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/safeguard/tiger.htm.  10 
 
pretexting is when a person, without authority to do so, attempts to gain access to the personal 
information of another by creating a false scenario. Examples of pretexting include impersonating the true 
account holder on the phone, by mail, or by e-mail, or using a fictitious website or e-mail that directs or 
solicits an individual to enter his or her personal information into fields that are captured (a practice 
commonly known as ―phishing‖).
48 Moreover, evidence gathered on the prevalence and nature of 
phishing attacks indicates that this form of pretexting is a growing and evolving threat.
49 To defend 
against pretexting, section 501 of the GLB Act requires financial institutions to ―protect the security and 
confidentiality of [their] customers‘ nonpublic personal information‖
50 and to put safeguards in place to 
―to protect against unauthorized access to or use of [consumers‘] records or information that could result 
in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.‖
51 Additionally, section 521 of the GLB Act makes 
it a crime for an individual to obtain consumer information by false pretenses or to solicit another to 
obtain consumer information from a financial institution under false pretenses.
52 Together, these 
provisions form the collective pretexting protections. Because pretexting is often a prelude to subsequent 
criminal offenses, such as payment fraud or identity theft,
53 forcing financial institutions to create policies 
that recognize and seek to mitigate the effects of pretexting is a major focus of regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies.
54 Currently, regulatory agencies and financial institutions are taking steps to 
educate consumers on how to identify such pretexting attempts, and technology providers are working to 
develop mechanisms to block unauthorized web-based phishing attacks.  
                                                 
48 For examples of cases of pretexting, see Federal Trade Comm’n v. Hill, Civ. Action No. H03-5537 (SD Tex. Dec. 
3, 2003); press release, ―FTC Charges Telemarketing Network with Selling Bogus Advance-Fee Credit Card 
Packages,‖ Federal Trade Commission, Jan. 17, 2003; and press release, ―Justice Department Halts Identity Theft 
Scam,‖ Federal Trade Commission, March 22, 2004. 
49 Anti-Phishing Working Group, ―Phishing Activity Trends Report, Q1/2008,‖ (Jan.–March 2008), pp. 2-4, 
available at: www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_Q1_2008.pdf.  
50 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2007). 
51 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(3) (2007). 
52 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821(a) & (b) (2007); and made a criminal offense under 15 U.S.C. § 6823 (2007). 
53 For more information on crimes frequently committed in connection with pretexting, see ―Pretexting: Your 
Personal Information Revealed,‖ FTC Facts for Consumers (Feb. 2006), available at: www.ftc.gov.  
54 See “Prepared Statement by the Federal Trade Commission Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Energy and Commerce on ‗Combating Pretexting: H.R. 936, Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone 
Records‘,‖ March 9, 2007, pp. 5-7, available at: www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/ 
P065409CommissionTestimonyReCombatingPretextingandHR936House.pdf (accessed Dec. 5, 2008). 11 
 
III.   Data Disposal, Receipt Truncation, and Red Flag Requirements of the Fair and Accurate  
        Credit Transactions Act  
  Also discussed during the workshop were consumer data protection and identity theft prevention 
rules contained in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT Act) of 2003,
55 including a 
provision that addresses the disposal of personal consumer information
56– which was designed to prevent 
criminals from obtaining complete credit and debit card information from transaction records,
57 and a set 
of provisions that require businesses to take particular actions to prevent identity theft when certain events 
commonly associated with fraud take place.
58 Under section 216 of the FACT Act, also known as the 
FACT Act data disposal section, federal banking agencies must ―issue final regulations requiring any 
person that maintains or otherwise possesses consumer information, or any compilation of consumer 
information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose to properly dispose of any such 
information or compilation.‖
59 The Fed, FTC, FDIC, OCC, and OTS have each enacted consumer data 
disposal protocols under section 216.
60 Under section 113 of the FACT Act, also known as the receipt 
truncation provision, ―no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business 
[and electronically prints receipts] shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the 
expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.‖
61 
Under section 114 of the FACT Act, also known as the FACT Act red flag provisions, federal banking 
agencies must establish and maintain guidelines designed to prevent identity theft, prescribe regulations 
                                                 
55 The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Public Law 108-159, Dec. 3, 2003, codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681 et seq. (2007). For a chart that juxtaposes sections of the FACT Act with corresponding sections of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, go to: www.bankersonline.com/tools/facta_chart_updated.pdf.  
56 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681w. 
57 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 
58 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e) & 1681c(h). 
59 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681w(a)(1). 
60 See ―Proper Disposal of Consumer Information Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,‖ 
Final Rule of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision, 69 Fed. Reg., pp. 77610-21, available at: 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2004/20041221/attachment.pdf (accessed Aug. 20, 2008) [effective 
July 1, 2005]; and ―Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records,‖ Federal Trade Commission Final Rule, 
69 Fed. Reg., pp. 68690-01 (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 682) [effective June 1, 2005], implementing the FACT Act‘s 
data disposal requirements.  
61 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 12 
 
that require financial institutions and creditors to establish policies and procedures implementing those 
guidelines, and ―prescribe regulations applicable to card issuers to ensure‖ that address changes received 
contemporaneously with requests for new cards are screened.
62 Under section 315 of the FACT Act, also 
known as the address discrepancy section (and which accompanies the red flag rules in subsequent 
rulemaking), the federal banking agencies must ―prescribe regulations providing guidance regarding 
reasonable policies and procedures that a user of a consumer report should employ when such user has 
received a notice‖ that there is an address discrepancy between an address reported and one already in a 
consumer credit report.
63 The Fed, FTC, FDIC, OCC, OTS, and NCUA enacted red flag and address 
discrepancy rules that went into effect November 1, 2008.
64 
Noting that section 216 of the FACT Act ―is designed to protect a consumer against the risks 
associated with unauthorized access to information about the consumer,‖ ―such as fraud and related 
crimes including identity theft,‖
65 the OCC, Fed, FDIC, and OTS (collectively referred to as the agencies) 
have implemented the FACT Act‘s data disposal requirements by amending the Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information to include consumer data disposal 
guidelines.
66 Under the amended guidelines, now called the Interagency Guidelines Establishing 
Standards for Information Security,
67 and supplemental information, institutions regulated by the agencies 
are ―expect[ed]‖ or ―generally require[d]‖ ―to adopt procedures and controls to properly dispose of 
‗consumer information‘ and ‗customer information,‘‖
68 and to ―develop, implement, and maintain [such 
                                                 
62 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e)(1)(A), (B) & (C). 
63 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(h)(2)(A). 
64 ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act  of 
2003,‖ Final Rule of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit Union Administration, and Federal Trade  
Commission, 72 Fed. Reg., pp. 63718-75, available at: www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2007/november/071109redflags.pdf 
(accessed Sept. 12, 2008) [effective Nov. 1, 2008]. 
65 “Proper Disposal of Consumer Information Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,‖ Final 
Rule, Supplementary Information, p. 3, and 69 Fed. Reg., p. 77610. 
66 69 Fed. Reg., pp. 77610-21. 
67 69 Fed. Reg., p. 77610. 
68 “Proper Disposal of Consumer Information Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,‖ [n. 65] 
Final Rule, Supplementary Information, p. 11. 13 
 
procedures and controls], as part of [their] existing information security program[s].‖
69 Indeed, criminal 
use of consumer information that has been disposed of for the purpose of stealing consumer identities has 
been well established.
70 Moreover, the use of disposed of information in phishing attacks—where 
fraudsters use already obtained information to attempt to gain other information that can then be used to 
commit fraud—is also well documented.
71 For these reasons, Subpart I of the guidelines requires covered 
institutions to ―properly dispose of any consumer information‖ that is in their possession.
72 The guidelines 
define ―consumer information‖ as ―any record about an individual, whether in paper, electronic, or other 
form, that is a consumer report or derived from a consumer report and that is maintained or otherwise 
possessed by or on behalf of the [covered institution] for a business purpose,‖ including any ―compilation 
of such records,‖
73 and require that all consumer information be disposed of ―in accordance with the 
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards,‖ and that consumer information be 
disposed of pursuant to information security programs implemented by covered institutions.
74 In 
accordance with these rules and guidelines, the agencies advise that ―an institution‘s information security 
program should ensure that paper records containing either customer or consumer information should be 
rendered unreadable as indicated by the institution‘s risk assessment, such as by shredding or other 
means.‖
75 Moreover, the agencies advocate that ―[i]nstitutions … should recognize that computer-based 
records present unique disposal problems,‖ such that ―additional disposal techniques should be applied to 
                                                 
69 69 Fed. Reg., p. 77610. 
70 See, for example, Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, ―Identity Crisis; as Society Gets More High-Tech, So Do the Thieves of 
Personal Information,‖ Chicago Tribune, Aug. 18, 2008, RedEye, p. 6 (noting that 20 percent of reported identity 
thefts involve a nontechnological method of obtaining confidential consumer victim information, such as dumpster 
diving); and Frank Abagnale, ―If You Make It Easy, Someone Will Steal from You,‖ Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Aug. 3, 2008, p. E4 (identifying ―traditional‖ methods of perpetrating identity theft and advising consumers to shred 
credit card statements, bank statements, and credit card offers). 
71 See, for example, ―Credit Card Inquiry May Be from Thief,‖ Allentown Morning Call, Aug. 21, 2008, p. B3 
(detailing a phishing attack in which the perpetrator used information obtained from dumpster diving or a low-tech 
means of information theft to perpetuate fraud on consumers by impersonating their credit card company so as to 
obtain sufficient information to commit identity theft). 
72 69 Fed. Reg., pp, 77616-21, Subpart I. 
73 69 Fed. Reg., pp. 77616-21, definitions of ―consumer information,‖ and provisions entitled ―Disposal of consumer 
information.‖ 
74 66 Fed. Reg., pp. 8632-41. 
75 “Proper Disposal of Consumer Information Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,‖ [n. 65] 
Final Rule, p. 11. 14 
 
sensitive electronic data‖ and the disposal of ―[r]esidual data [that] frequently remains on media after 
erasure‖ is ensured.
76  
Making sure that organizations properly dispose of consumers‘ information is of interest to both 
federal and state policymakers intent on protecting consumers. To ensure that state regulators are not 
unduly inhibited by the legislation, a provision of the FACT Act‘s consumer data disposal requirements 
states that the act ―does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the [act] from complying 
with the laws of any State‖ and notes that state laws will be unaffected by the act unless they are found to 
be inconsistent with federal legislation.
77 In fact, several states now provide consumers with added 
protection against identity theft through laws that stipulate further requirements for disposing of consumer 
records
78 or create identity theft resolution programs designed to assist victims and prevent further 
damage in the aftermath of identity theft.
79 The point was raised during the workshop that issues related to 
the disposal of consumer records are likely to continue to be a popular topic among state legislatures as 
legislators seek to prevent low-tech forms of data taking, such as dumpster diving, and related fraud. 
Dumpster diving, delving into the trash for confidential consumer information, is recognized as a ―top 
tactic‖
80 of identity thieves and is linked to as much as 20 percent of all identity theft cases.
81 As noted 
earlier,
82 in order to help prevent precisely this sort of access to consumer information, a provision of the 
                                                 
76 See n. 75. 
77 Sections 114 and 315 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1681m(e)(1)(A), (B) & (C), and § 1681c(h), respectively.  
78 Hawaii, Indiana, and Texas, for example, have all enacted laws that govern the disposal or destruction of 
consumer records.  
79 For more information on one such program in Nevada, see Jean Mitchell, “State Offers Help with Identity Theft 
Consequences,‖ Reno Gazette-Journal, Aug. 22, 2008, p. 14. 
80 Phil Mulkins, ―Take Steps to Thwart Identity Thieves,‖ Tulsa World, Aug. 27, 2008, p. E4. See also Christopher 
Conkey, ―Politics & Economics: Identity Thieves, Methods More Diverse That Believed, Study Finds,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 20, 2007, p. A5, detailing a study finding that approximately half of all identity thefts perpetrated 
between 2000 and 2007 made use of the Internet or other technological means, and that the remaining half were low 
tech. 
81 See ―Identity Crisis; as Society Gets More High-Tech, So Do the Thieves of Personal Information,‖ [n. 70]. 
82 See pp. 11-12, herein. 15 
 
FACT Act,
83 in effect for all businesses since 2006, requires credit and debit card information to be 
shortened by merchants who print receipts.
84 
A separate set of provisions of the FACT Act requires covered institutions to develop procedures 
that help identify actions or tactics commonly used by identity thieves.
85 As part of red flag and address 
discrepancy regulations that implement the FACT Act, released in October of 2007,
86 financial 
institutions
87 must develop and ―implement a written Program to detect, prevent and mitigate identity 
theft in connection with the opening of an account or an existing account.‖
88 While such programs are to 
―be tailored to an entity‘s size, complexity and [the] nature of its operations,‖ organizations covered under 
the rules must ―[i]dentify relevant Red Flags for [incorporation] into the Program‖ as well as ―[d]etect 
Red Flags that have been incorporated into the Program; [r]espond appropriately to any Red Flags that are 
detected to prevent and mitigate identity theft; and [e]nsure the Program is updated periodically, to reflect 
changes in risks to customers or to the safety and soundness of the financial institution or creditor from 
identity theft.‖
89 A ―red flag‖ is defined as ―a pattern, practice or specific activity that indicates the 
possible existence of identity theft.‖
90 The rules enumerate some 26 red flags and include, for example, 
the provision by a person of suspicious-looking documents or information, the receipt of a notice from a 
consumer credit reporting agency that an individual‘s file is frozen or that there is a discrepant address on 
                                                 
83 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 
84 Noting that fraudsters and identity thieves frequently look for consumer card information printed on sales receipts, 
and characterizing receipts with full credit or debit card numbers and expiration dates as a ―golden ticket‖ for 
identity thieves, the FTC has issued guidance to businesses to help them understand the importance of printing 
receipts containing truncated information; see ―FTC Business Alert, Slip Showing?,‖ FTC Business Alert Bulletin 
(May 2007), p. 1. 
85 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e) & 1681c(h). 
86 See press release, ―Agencies Issue Final Rules on Identity Theft Red Flags and Notices of Address Discrepancy,‖ 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Oct. 31, 2007. 
87 For more information on who must comply with these rules see Federal Trade Commission, “New ‗Red Flag‘ 
Requirements for Financial Institutions and Creditors Will Help Fight Identity Theft,‖ FTC Business Alert Bulletin 
(June 2008), pp. 1-2.  
88 See ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003,‖ Final Rule, at Subparts J [n. 64].  
89 See ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003,‖ Final Rule, pp. 63719-20 [n. 64]. 
90 See ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003,‖ Final Rule, p. 63723 [n. 64]. 16 
 
file, or, the use of a newly applied for line of credit for expenditures commonly associated with fraud.
91 
Under the address discrepancy portion of the regulations, financial institutions that receive notice from 
consumer reporting agencies that there is a difference between the address they have provided and the 
consumer‘s addresses on file with the agency must take steps to verify that the ―consumer report relates to 
the consumer about whom [the information has been] requested.‖
92 Such verification steps, which must 
establish a reasonable belief that the consumer is who he or she purports to be, include comparing the 
address with previously held information, obtaining corroborative information from third-party sources, 
and contacting the consumer to confirm.  
Overall, the red flag and address discrepancy rules, which went into effect on November 1, 2008, 
have met with a mixed response. While state agencies, such as New York state‘s Consumer Protection 
Board, and credit reporting agencies have expressed support for the rules, characterizing them as ―a 
positive step forward,‖
93 many organizations have conveyed concern. Canadian banks with both 
American and Canadian customers have noted that they will be forced either to differentiate between their 
customers, implementing some sort of earmarking system, or to simply ―extend blanket coverage‖ as a 
result of U.S. regulation.
94 Moreover, and reflecting the challenges that many nonbanks covered under the 
act face, the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) has opposed the rules. The NADA has 
argued that many dealers will be unable to meet the onerous burden of detecting fraud and identity theft, 
and that recognizing activities that indicate fraud is simply beyond the many dealers‘ or dealerships‘ 
abilities.
95 And while some American banks have also expressed displeasure with the rules— for 
                                                 
91 See ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003,‖ Final Rule, at Supplement A to Appendix J [n. 64]. 
92 See ―Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003,‖ Final Rule, at Subpart I [n. 64]. 
93 Press release, ―Identity Theft Red Flag Rules Help Banks and Credit Card Companies Protect Consumers‘ 
Identities,‖ New York State Consumer Protection Board, available at: 
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94 Kathleen Lau, ―U.S. ‗Red Flag‘ Rules Could Affect Canadian Banks,‖ ComputerWorld Canada, Aug. 19, 2008.  
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Steve Santiago, ―New Red Flag Rules to Stem ID Theft,‖ bankrate.com article, as reported by Yahoo Finance News, 
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example, the Illinois Bankers Association called them ―excessive and overly burdensome‖
96—most 
domestic financial institutions have simply communicated apprehension that compliance, training, and 
ongoing implementation will require a considerable expenditure of resources.
97 Indeed, a recent survey of 
300 financial institutions found that almost half will ―either barely meet or will miss the [November 1 red 
flag and address discrepancy rule] deadline.‖
98 Nonetheless, and despite these concerns, many banks have 
praised regulators for taking into consideration that not all financial institutions are alike and for 
providing flexibility surrounding the creation of fraud detection programs under the rules.
99 In the end, 
many technology security experts view these rules as necessary in today‘s digital environment. Danny 
Shaw, a risk management expert with the technology auditing firm of Jefferson Wells, notes that financial 
institutions simply ―need to look at this as part of their normal best practice.‖
100 Moreover, Heather 
Grover, a director of product management for Experian, believes ―that many [financial institutions] will 




IV.  State Laws About Social Security Numbers   
When the federal government established a system of assigning Social Security numbers to 
Americans in 1936, its primary purpose was to create a system whereby workers‘ wages could be tracked 
and eligibility for retirement benefits could be determined.
102 At the time, the role that Social Security 
numbers would come to play for today‘s consumers and their eventual (and resulting) popularity among 
                                                 
96 ―New Red Flag Rules to Stem ID Theft‖ [n. 95], quoting an Illinois Bankers Association position letter to the 
FDIC. 
97 Steve Garmhausen, “The Tricky Business of Identity Theft Compliance,‖ American Banker, April 8, 2008. 
98 See ―U.S. ‗Red Flag‘ Rules Could Affect Canadian Banks‖ [n. 94], citing a BankInfoSecurity survey of financial 
institutions on their readiness to implement red flag and address discrepancy rules.  
99 Joe Adler, ―FACT Act Rules Have Some Give,‖ American Banker, Oct. 17, 2007. 
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102 California Office of Privacy Protection, Recommended Practices on Protecting the Confidentiality of Social 
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data thieves was unforeseeable.
103 Indeed, Social Security numbers have become a favorite target for 
cyber criminals, a ―crown jewel‖
104 of consumers‘ personal information, a ―magic key‖ for identity 
thieves.
105 The Government Accountability Office has noted that Social Security numbers ―are a key 
piece of information used to create false identities for financial misuse or assume another individual‘s 
identity,‖ and that ―[m]ost often, identity thieves use Social Security numbers belonging to real 
people.‖
106 Nonetheless, and despite widespread recognition that fraudsters often make use of others‘ 
Social Security numbers, on the Internet the numbers are frequently available for purchase,
107 are posted 
inadvertently,
108are available as a result of court proceedings,
109 or are readable on imaged documents 
made available by the government.
110 
Seeking to reduce the sale, availability of, and the resulting fraudulent use of Social Security 
numbers,
111 more than 42 states have, since 2005,
112 enacted some form of law that regulates the use of, or 
                                                 
103 For a report detailing the importance of Social Security numbers to identity thieves and vulnerabilities generated 
by the widespread use of Social Security numbers today, see Government Accountability Office, Social Security 
Numbers: Federal Actions Could Further Decrease Availability in Public Records, Though Other Vulnerabilities 
Remain, GAO-07-752 (June 2007), available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07752.pdf.  
104 Heather Mark, ―Personal Security Authentication,‖ Transactions World Magazine (July 2008), p. 1. 
105 Daniel Solove, prepared testimony and statement of Daniel J. Solove, Associate Professor of Law, George 
Washington University Law School, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy & Commerce 
Hearing on Securing Consumers‘ Data: Options Following a Data Breach, May 11, 2005, p. 5. 
106 Social Security Numbers: Federal Actions Could Decrease Availability in Public Records, [n. 103] p. 14.  
107 See Jonathan Krim, ―Net Aids Access to Sensitive ID Data, Social Security Numbers Are Widely Available,‖ 
Washington Post, April 4, 2005, p. A01. 
108 See Bill Hendrick, ―Insurance Records of 71,000 Ga. Families Made Public,‖ Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 
8, 2008. 
109 See Glenn Hagele, ―Whistleblower‘s Social Security Number Published; Court Orders Internet Data Blocked,‖ 
Reuters /PRNewswire article, Dec. 12, 2007, noting that an individual‘s Social Security number was recently found 
posted to various websites after it was obtained from court documents and posted to the Internet as the result of a 
retaliatory action; and Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4
th Cir. 1993), addressing whether a voter could be 
compelled to disclose his or her Social Security number, which would then be published in public voting rolls. 
110 See Damon Darlin, ―Think Your Social Security Number Is Secure? Think Again,‖ New York Times, at 
nytimes.com, Feb. 24, 2007, and Government Accountability Office, Social Security Numbers: Federal and State 
Laws Restrict Use of SSNs, Yet Gaps Remain, GAO-05-1016T, p. 7 (Sept. 2005). 
111 For example, the preamble to Georgia Senate Bill 475 states that the legislation‘s purpose is ―[t]o amend various 
provisions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated as they relate to identity fraud and the collection and 
dissemination of personal identifying and financial information on individuals and businesses so as to protect such 
information from being utilized in an unlawful manner; to amend Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated, relating to crimes and offenses, so as to change provisions relating to definitions, financial identity fraud, 
and racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.‖ 
112 For a survey of enacted state laws concerning Social Security numbers by year, visit the National Conference of 
State Legislatures‘ website at www.ncsl.org. The site‘s search function will yield results on these laws (visited and 
searched Aug. 20, 2008).  19 
 
mandates a particular method for protecting, Social Security numbers.
113 However, the range of these 
laws is broad. Similar to the safeguards rule of the GLB Act, a number of state laws require written 
confidentiality policies designed to protect Social Security numbers; other state laws require that 
interorganizational access to Social Security numbers be limited to authorized personnel only; and still 
other state laws create requirements for disposing of documents containing Social Security numbers 
similar to the FACT Act‘s requirements for disposing of personal consumer information. Despite this 
range, the most common types of state legislation concerning Social Security numbers come in the form 
of laws that: (1) prohibit companies from printing the numbers on identification cards or other materials; 
(2) restrict the intentional communication of Social Security numbers, whether by mail or public posting; 
or (3) require that Social Security numbers be truncated, erased, or otherwise modified.
114 Arizona law, 
for example, prohibits the printing of Social Security numbers on identification cards and the intentional 
disclosure of the numbers to the general public and sets standards for the transmission of Social Security 
numbers over the Internet.
115 Meanwhile, Colorado and Georgia laws set special disposal requirements for 
Social Security numbers.
116 Georgia law requires Social Security numbers contained on paper records to 
be shredded and that they be completely erased when contained on electronic records, or to otherwise be 
―modifie[d]‖ so as to be ―unreadable.‖
117 However, some states have taken a more comprehensive 
approach. 
California law provides an illustration of how comprehensive state legislation can operate. 
Generally recognized as the first state to enact privacy protections for Social Security numbers, California 
phased in Civil Code sections 1798.85 through 1798.89 from 2001 to 2005.
118 Under section 1798.5, ―a 
person or entity‖ (including businesses and other organizations) may not: (1) publicly post or display a 
                                                 
113 For more information on these laws, see ―Social Security Number Protection Legislation for States,‖ 
ConsumersUnion.org, available at: www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/004801.html (accessed 
Sept. 15, 2008). 
114 ―Social Security Number Protection Legislation for States‖ [n. 113], providing groupings of various types of state 
laws concerning Social Security numbers. 
115 See Arizona House Bill 2429 (46
th Legislature, First Regular Session, 2003). 
116 See Colorado House Bill 06-1156 (signed into law, March 2006), and Georgia Senate Bill 475 (2002). 
117 Georgia Senate Bill 475 (2002). 
118 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.85 & 1798.89 (2002); phased in under § 1798.85(d); available at: 
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Social Security number in any way; (2) print a Social Security number on any card required to access 
products or services; (3) require an individual to transmit his or her Social Security number over the 
Internet unless the connection is secure and the number is encrypted; (4) require an individual to use his 
or her Social Security number alone to access a website; (5) print a Social Security number on mailed 
materials in many circumstances; or (6) encode or embed Social Security numbers in cards or documents 
as a way of avoiding having to remove Social Security numbers under the regulation.
119 Additionally, and 
to further address emerging issues concerning Social Security numbers, California‘s legislators created 
the Office of Privacy Protection.
120 The office is generally charged with ―mak[ing] recommendations to 
organizations for privacy policies and practices that promote and protect the interests of California 
consumers.‖
121 Along with researching and identifying consumer privacy issues, the office provides a 
continually updated set of recommended practices for handling Social Security numbers in a manner 
tending to maintain confidentiality and in a fashion that complies with the state‘s laws.
122  
While state laws concerning Social Security numbers have generally sought to create a more 
structured and secure environment for personal consumer information, issues remain. First, the role that 
state Social Security number legislation plays is complicated by the fact that businesses have created their 
own rules about how these numbers ought to be handled. While state laws have some underlying 
influence over how businesses handle Social Security numbers, federal government interviews of 
employees at banks, securities firms, telecommunication firms, and tax preparation firms regarding how 
Social Security numbers are shared with third-party vendors indicate that companies rely primarily on 
complex commercial contracts and recognized industry practices when deciding what to do.
123 Second, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted that although state laws about Social Security 
numbers provide ―some consistency‖ in their protection of consumers‘ information, these laws vary 
                                                 
119 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.85(a). 
120 Cal. Gov. Code § 11549.5(a) (2000). 
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122 See California Office of Privacy Protection, ―Recommended Practices on Protecting the Confidentiality of Social 
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widely. The GAO also found that inconsistency among the intentions of legislatures—particularly 
between intending to prevent identity theft and intending to increase privacy protections—remains a 
significant concern that must be addressed.
124 Echoing this notion—that policymakers‘ understanding of 
the relationship between failures in information security and fraud is varied—payments industry feedback 
provided during past conferences sponsored by the Payment Cards Center indicates that confusion 
abounds in the payments industry concerning the links that connect data breaches, identity theft, and 
fraud.
125 Indeed, the importance of establishing a common understanding of the differences between 
failures of privacy protections and fraud is made more prominent by recent research on data breaches and 
related financial crimes that indicates there is, perhaps, less of a link between data breaches and crimes 
related to personal consumer information than previously believed. Although the number of data breaches 
is increasing dramatically,
126 some observers report that the incidence of identity theft is decreasing. One 
recent study notes that in 2007, 8.1 million Americans suffered identity theft, half a million fewer than the 
previous year, with related losses dropping 12 percent.
127 A 2007 report by the GAO that looked at the 
connection between data breaches and subsequent crimes found that of the ―24 largest breaches that 
appeared in the news media from January 2000 through June 2005,‖ three of them seem ―to have resulted 
in fraud on existing accounts, and [one] breach appear[s] to have resulted in the unauthorized creation of 
new accounts,‖
128 a weaker connection than many analysts previously supposed.  
 
V.  State Laws About Data Security Breach Notification     
The last type of legislation discussed during the workshop was state laws related to notifying 
consumers about data security breaches or, simply, data breach notification laws. Approximately 39 states 
                                                 
124 Social Security Numbers: Federal Actions Could Decrease Availability in Public Records, [n. 103], p. 19. 
125 See, for example, ―Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information,‖ [n. 26], pp.10-
21, detailing uncertainties over the interrelatedness between data breaches, poor information security, and identity 
theft. 
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presently possess a data breach notification law, and 48 states, all but New Mexico and South Dakota, 
have such a law on their books or have a data breach notification bill pending before their legislature.
129 
As was discussed during the workshop, these laws generally require notification of consumers, state 
agencies, or other parties when unencrypted personal information held in some fashion by an organization 
is acquired or accessed by an unauthorized person. However, state data breach notification laws differ 
widely. Statutes diverge over whether they cover both computerized and paper data thefts, what is 
considered personal information, the manner of notification required, whether they require state agencies 
to be notified, whether they require credit reporting agencies to be notified, and what types of events 
trigger notification requirements. A number of states require notification only when there is an 
identifiable risk of harm to a consumer, while others require notification when information is reasonably 
believed to have been accessed by an unauthorized party in a manner constituting a breach.  
  Although state laws about data security breach notification differ, one example of such a law  is 
California‘s Database Breach Notification Security Act (CDBNSA). California, one of the first states to 
establish a data security breach notification requirement, enacted the CDBNSA in 2002, with the law 
going into effect July 1, 2003.
130 Under the CDBNSA, the ―owner‖ or ―licens[or]‖ of personal consumer 
data must disclose any breach to ―any resident of California whose personal information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person‖ once a breach has occurred.
131 
The law defines a ―breach of the security of [a] system‖ as an ―unauthorized acquisition of computerized 
data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.‖
132 Personal 
information is defined as ―an individual‘s first name or first initial and last name in combination with any 
one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: 
(1) Social Security number; (2) driver‘s license number or California identification card number; (3) 
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account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access 
code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account; (4) medical information; 
and (5) health insurance information.‖
133 It was noted during the workshop that establishing whether 
notification requirements have been triggered, and drafting a notification is often more complicated than 
one might imagine. To provide ongoing assistance with this, California offers continually updated 
guidance on the precise notification requirements essential to the state‘s mandated data breach reporting 
process.
134 
  Looking further at differences between states‘ laws, workshop participants pointed out that 
many states have special or unique requirements when it comes to data breach notification. New York and 
Maine, for example, require that their attorneys general be notified when a breach has occurred, and New 
Jersey requires that its state police be notified. Such divergent requirements, it was observed, often make 
compliance with these laws a difficult task for businesses. Indeed, this issue and, more broadly, 
businesses‘ ability to understand what constitutes a breach under states‘ laws and then to practically 
establish that a data security breach has occurred (or that the type of data breach that has occurred 
requires reporting) is receiving national attention as a result of the current prosecution of 11 criminals 
responsible for stealing consumers‘ information from several large companies‘ databases.
135 As the 
Justice Department has revealed in this case, nine major retailers‘ systems were ultimately breached in a 
prolonged attack, and despite the seeming operation of applicable state data breach notification laws, only 
four retailers—TJX, BJ‘s Wholesale Club, DSW, and Dave and Buster‘s—appear to have notified 
consumers.
136 Two other retailers, Boston Market and Forever 21, initially reported that they ―never told 
customers because they never confirmed data were stolen from them.‖
137 Moreover, Forever 21 officials 
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have subsequently stated that they have not notified consumers whose information was accessed because 
the stolen information did not include customer names and addresses and because ―they do not believe 
any of the stolen [information] was used fraudulently.‖
138 Three more retailers—OfficeMax, Barnes and 
Noble, and Sports Authority—appear to have remained silent about whether they have made disclosures; 
the Wall Street Journal reported that ―computer searches of their Securities and Exchange Commission 
filings, Web sites, press releases and news archives [concerning these companies] turned up no evidence 
of such disclosures.‖
139 These types of challenges—challenges concerning the implementation of data 
breach notification laws (particularly, the absence of a common understanding among payment industry 
participants and merchants as to what specific events trigger reporting requirements or constitute risks 
that must be reported)—were recognized by conference participants during a 2006 Payment Cards Center 
conference.
140 Those participants noted that confusion about what was required under different types of 
data breach notification laws ―need[ed] to be resolved [in order for] the [legal] framework [to be] 
effective, intelligible, and viable for organizations that act nationally and internationally.‖
    
  The final issues addressed during the workshop surrounded the impact that state data breach 
notification laws have on consumers, including how consumers respond in the wake of a data breach or 
suspected breach. Workshop participants noted that while many notices satisfy the basic legal 
requirements to explain obligations and rights accurately, notices, at times, may appear to fall short when 
providing explanations that are meaningful to their readers. To help resolve this problem and deal with 
difficult issues surrounding data breach notices, government agencies, consumer advocacy groups, and 
state regulators all make resources available to businesses to help craft clearer notices—notices that are 
capable of providing consumers with useful information in language that consumers are likely to 
understand.
141 Looking beyond whether consumers understand the data breach notices they receive, one 
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workshop attendee noted that consumers often behave in ways that are difficult to predict. This 
phenomenon was recently addressed during a 2008 Payment Cards Center conference on fraud, when 
payments industry experts noted that there appears to be a significant disparity between what consumers 
say they will do after receiving a data breach notification and what they actually do.
142 Although 
consumers frequently report that they will stop shopping at a merchant deemed responsible for a data 
breach leading to the compromise of their personal information, conference participants noted that in 
many cases these same merchants report increased sales levels after a publicized breach. Additional 
awareness of discrepancies between what consumers do and say, the effects of state data breach 
notification laws, and the connections between data breaches and identity theft generally
143 is being 
generated by a recent Carnegie Mellon University study that analyzes data from the FTC in an attempt to 
measure the ―impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft over the years 2002 to 2006.‖
 144 
Using ―state and year fixed effect regression analysis to empirically estimate the impact of data breach 
laws,‖ the study finds “no statistically significant” evidence that data breach notification laws reduce 
identity theft, ―even after considering income, urbanization, strictness of law and interstate commerce.‖
145 
While the authors of the Carnegie Mellon study admit that there may be some issues with the underlying 
methodology used in the study,
146 and payments industry data security analysts have noted that it is 
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difficult to draw conclusions from the study because the underlying data (reports submitted by consumers 
to the FTC) are often incomplete,
147 they note that the FTC remains the only source for this kind of data. 
  Summing up the state data breach notification law portion of the workshop, attendees 
acknowledged that while the potential for consistent data breach regulations or standards has been well 
recognized by payments industry participants,
148 recent research suggests that more work is needed to 
better determine what kinds of initiatives might be most effective in preventing fraud and protecting 
consumers. However, they recognized that any organization that possesses or handles consumers‘ 
personal information needs to be prepared for an attack on its data security systems. Workshop 
participants noted that irrespective of nuances in states‘ data breach notification laws, it simply makes 
sense to be prepared for a breach in today‘s technological environment—one where wireless devices 
abound, remote access is commonplace, and the services of third-party consultants and vendors are 
necessary.
149          
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  For more than a decade federal and state legislators have sought to create a more structured and 
secure environment for private consumer data and to help protect consumers whose personal information 
has been compromised; however, challenges and issues remain. These include forming a better 
understanding of the links that connect data breaches, identity theft, and fraud; establishing more 
universally understood data breach notification requirements for businesses (or even a commonly 
recognized definition for data breaches); overcoming obstacles related to consumers (such as ensuring 
that consumers understand breach, opt-out, or policy notices they receive and avoiding consumer 
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desensitization to these types of information);
150 and creating solutions that are flexible enough to adjust 
to changes in technology and fraudsters‘ tactics. Pointing to today‘s technological environment, one in 
which wireless devices and remote access are commonplace, workshop participants noted that attacks on 
data security systems can and will be staged in new and unanticipated ways—something that must be 
anticipated by policymakers and industry participants alike. Participants also drew attention to the fact 
that the problem extends well beyond criminal attacks on computer systems, noting that leaked data also 
originates from the actions of organizations‘ own employees, whether negligent or intentional. 
Furthermore, participants also suggested that increasing reliance on third-party data processors, data 
storage suppliers, and other third-party data service providers will create additional challenges to 
safeguarding consumers‘ financial information as massive files containing such information change hands 
more frequently and come into contact with more individuals. The workshop concluded with participants 
encouraging the Payment Cards Center to continue promoting critical dialogue and research on these 
issues as an important contribution to the industry‘s (and policymakers‘) efforts to develop effective 
solutions.  
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